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Abstract 
This paper focuses on issues of financial sector liberalization in Ethiopia, with reference 
in particular to the Ethiopian banking sector. We identify two factors that may constrain 
Ethiopia’s financial development. One is the closed nature of the Ethiopian financial 
sector in which there are no foreign banks, a non-competitive market structure, and 
strong capital controls in place. The other is the dominant role of state-owned banks. 
Our observations suggest that the Ethiopian economy would benefit from financial 
sector liberalization, especially from the entry of foreign banks and the associated 
privatization of state-owned banks. 
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Ethiopia appears unique compared to its East African neighbors (namely Kenya, 
Tanzania, and Uganda) and many other developing countries in that it has not yet 
opened its banking sector to foreign participation.
1 The Ethiopian banking sector 
remains isolated from the impact of globalization. Although Ethiopian policy makers 
understand the potential importance of financial liberalization,
2 it is widely believed 
that liberalization may result in loss of control over the economy and may not be 
economically beneficial.
3
While Ethiopia’s financial sector has not been studied to any great extent, the 
benefits of financial sector liberalization for developing countries have been widely 
investigated, with conclusions suggesting that there may be significant positive effects 
involved. For example, Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine, and Min (1998) investigated the effects 
of foreign bank presence in 80 countries between 1988 and 1995. They found that 
liberalizing restrictions on foreign bank entry accelerated the efficiency of the domestic 
banking sector, and thereby contributed to long-run economic growth. Mattoo, 
Rathindran, and Subramanian (2006) examined the effects of financial liberalization on 
per-capita GNP growth in 59 countries between 1990 and 1999 and found that openness 
in financial services had positive and significant effects on economic growth. Similarly, a number of studies have examined whether the level of development 
of financial intermediation and the degree of state ownership of banks were 
determinants of economic growth. Thus, for example, Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) 
examined the effects of financial intermediation on economic growth in 74 countries 
from 1960 to 1995 and found that greater financial intermediation development had a 
significantly positive impact on economic growth. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2002) examined the ownership structure of banks in 92 countries and found 
that higher government ownership of banks resulted in lower per-capita GDP growth 
from 1960 to 1995, even when initial financial intermediation development had a 
positive and significant effect. They also found that higher government ownership of 
banks was associated with slower subsequent financial sector development and lower 
productivity growth. It is noteworthy that, because of data constraints, these studies did 
not include Ethiopia.
4
What distinguishes our paper is that we take a close look at the Ethiopian 
banking sector to consider whether Ethiopia would benefit from allowing foreign 
participation. Our contribution is threefold. First, we utilize Ethiopian bank-level data to 
analyze the performance of state-owned vis-à-vis privately-held banks. Second, we 
identify the stakeholder opposition to financial sector liberalization. Finally, we address 
  2the potential benefits and qualifications to liberalization for the Ethiopian economy. 
In what follows, Section 2 provides background information on the Ethiopian 
economy and financial sector development. Section 3 compares Ethiopia’s key 
economic, social, and financial indicators with those of other East and Sub-Saharan 
African (SSA) countries. Section 4 examines the performance of state-owned and 
private banks in Ethiopia. Section 5 outlines the stakeholder opposition to financial 
sector liberalization, and Section 6 considers the potential benefits and qualifications to 
liberalization. Section 7 concludes. 
2.  Historical Background: Ethiopian Economy and Financial Sector 
Ethiopia has some notable historical differences compared to other countries in 
the region. Although occupied by the Italians for a short time in the 1930s, Ethiopia 
does not share the colonial legacy of its neighbors. Its population (now nearly 80 
million) has historically been, and continues to be, almost evenly divided between 
Coptic Christians and Muslims, with a very small Jewish population still located in the 
Northwest of the country. The Ethiopian economy has been state controlled through a 
series of industrial development plans since the Imperial Government of Haile Selassie. 
It was managed as a Soviet-style centrally planned economy under a socialist 
government from 1976-1991. The post-1991 government led a transition to a more 
  3market-based system, and subsequent governments have introduced further reforms. 
Although state control has been reduced and domestic and foreign (private) investment 
promoted, the state still plays a dominant role in the economy today. 
Ethiopia’s financial sector remains closed and is much less developed than its 
neighbors. Ethiopia has no capital market and very limited informal investing in shares 
of private companies. A series of financial sector reforms has been introduced since 
1994, when private banks were allowed to be re-established. But the three large 
state-owned banks continue to dominate the market in terms of capital, deposits and 
assets. The current government is committed to alleviating poverty through private- 
sector development and through integrating Ethiopia into the global economy. However, 
the government does not at this time seem prepared to privatize large state-owned 
enterprises (or banks), allow for private ownership of land, or open the financial sector 
to foreign participation and competition. 
3.  How Is Ethiopia Different from Other African Countries? 
As noted, Ethiopia has a unique economic and social/historical background, but 
it is not clear how it is different from other African countries. To address this question, 
this section compares key economic, social, and financial indicators for Ethiopia with 
those of other African countries. 
  4Table 1 summarizes the key indicators for four East African countries (Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) as a whole. Ethiopia has 
similar economic and social features compared to many other African countries, 
including historically low per-capita GDP growth rates, an underdeveloped 
infrastructure, and a legal system based on English law. But Ethiopia also has some 
differences from other African countries. In 2005, per-capita GDP was 140.6 U.S. 
dollars, the lowest level in East Africa. Agricultural dependency and rural population are 
46.3 and 84.0 percent, respectively, both of which are among the highest in East Africa. 
Life expectancy is 42.7 years, the lowest in the region. Only 22.0 percent of the 
population has access to clean drinking water, which is the lowest in SSA. These 
characteristics clearly show that Ethiopia is one of the least developed countries in East 
Africa and among SSA countries. 
=== Table 1 === 
Table 1 also includes key financial indicators. Following Levine et al. (2000), 
we utilize three financial intermediation variables. The first indicator is liquid liabilities, 
which is defined as M3 (currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks 
and non-bank financial institutions) as a percentage of GDP. According to Levine et al., 
this is a typical measure of ‘financial depth’ and thus of the overall size of the financial 
  5sector. The second indicator, commercial-central bank, is defined as commercial bank 
assets as a share of commercial bank plus central bank assets. This measure captures 
how the economy’s savings are allocated to commercial banks. The third indicator is 
private credit, defined as credit extended to the private sector as a ratio to GDP. Levine 
et al. (2000) emphasize the key importance of private credit. 
As previously noted, Levine et al. (2000) found a strong positive relationship 
between the development of financial intermediation and economic growth. Based on 
Ethiopia’s poor economic and social indicators, one may expect Ethiopian financial 
intermediation to perform poorly. However, this is not borne out by all the financial 
intermediation indicators noted in Table 1. That is, in 2004, credit issued to the private 
sector in Ethiopia was 19.1 percent of GDP (the 2nd highest in East Africa and the 5th 
in SSA), and liquid liabilities were 44.6 percent of GDP (the largest in East Africa and 
the fourth in SSA). 
However, on closer inspection, with respect to private credit to GDP, Ethiopia’s 
GDP is relatively low, so this does not necessarily mean then that intermediation is 
stronger in Ethiopia on this dimension. Note also that Ethiopia’s gross domestic saving 
rate is only 3.6 percent, the lowest in East Africa. This implies that much of the 
population does not have ready access to banking services, and it may also be the case 
  6that the infrastructure for banking in rural areas is especially poor. It should also be 
noted that liquid liabilities (i.e., M3) can be increased by worker remittances rather than 
domestic saving. Hence, the credit issued and liquidity indicators noted may not reflect 
depth in Ethiopia’s financial system. 
It is further worth noting that the financial liberalization index, which measures 
banking security and independence from government control, on a scale of 10 to 100 
(100 being the most liberal), is only 20 for Ethiopia (the lowest in SSA). This indicates 
that the Ethiopian financial sector is highly controlled by the government, a finding that 
is consistent with Dailami (2000), who ranked Ethiopia as the most closed country in 
the 96 countries for 1997 covered in his study. 
Moreover, bank concentration, defined as the asset share of the three largest 
banks, is 87.9 percent in Ethiopia, which is the highest in East Africa. Indeed, the 
Ethiopian banking sector is dominated by one large state-owned bank, the Commercial 
Bank of Ethiopia (CBE). Table 2 presents the assets of Ethiopian banks for 1998-2006.
5 
In 2004, there were three state-owned banks and six private banks. The asset share of 
the CBE was 66.3 percent, while the share of all three state-owned banks was nearly 80 
percent. These results clearly indicate the dominant state control of the Ethiopian 
banking sector. 
  7=== Table 2 === 
The foregoing observations have important implications. As discussed above, 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (1998) and Mattoo et al. (2006) found a positive relationship 
between financial sector openness and economic growth. Mattoo et al. emphasized that 
the key elements of financial openness are domestic market competition, foreign 
ownership, and limited capital controls, all of which are lacking in Ethiopia. That is, 
high bank concentration indicates a lack of competition in Ethiopia’s banking sector. 
Foreign banks are not permitted to enter the market in any form, and the Ethiopian 
Government maintains strong control over international capital movements. 
We may also note the study by Beck et al. (2004), who concluded that increases 
in bank concentration were an obstacle to obtaining finance. They found that the 
constraining effects of bank concentration were exacerbated by more restrictions on 
bank activities, more government interference in the banking sector, and a larger share 
of government-owned banks. By the same token, these constraining effects were 
dampened by the presence of a large share of foreign banks. It would appear therefore 
that the highly closed nature of the in Ethiopian financial sector would serve to negate   
the positive effects that would otherwise come from greater financial intermediation. 
4.  State-owned Versus Private Banks   
  8Several studies such as La Porta et al. (2002) have found that the performance 
of private banks is typically better than state-owned banks. The previous section 
suggests that the large asset share of state-owned banks may be a factor that inhibits 
growth. This section examines whether state-owned banks underperform relative to 
private banks. 
Table 3 presents the total assets and return on assets (ROA) of Ethiopian 
state-owned and private banks from 1998 to 2006. It can be seen that the share of assets 
of private banks grew from 6.4 percent in 1998 to 30.4 percent in 2006. This in turn 
implies that the share of state-owned banks significantly declined. Note, however, that 
the values of total assets increased from 1998 to 2006 for both state-owned and private 
banks. This suggests that the Ethiopian banking sector has grown rapidly. The growth of 
private banks has been much faster than state-owned banks, although more than 
two-thirds of assets are still held by state-owned banks.
6 It is also evident that private 
banks show generally better performance than state-owned banks. In seven out of nine 
years, private banks had higher ROA than state-owned banks. Note, however, that the 
ROA of the private banks did not improve for the last three years, 2004-06. 
=== Table 3 === 
Table 4 shows the interest-rate spreads between state-owned and private banks. 
  9Three findings stand out from this table. First, these spreads increased from 1998 to 
2006 for both state-owned and private banks, though it should be noted that since 2003, 
interest rate spreads of private banks have declined, suggesting that competition has 
increased. Second, private banks have higher interest-rate spreads than state-owned 
banks. Third, the deposit rate is the same for state-owned and private banks, implying 
that the differences in interest-rate spreads reflect differences in lending rates between 
banks. It may be noted that with the new entry of private banks, lending rates have 
consistently decreased since 2002. Deposit rates were still fixed by the National Bank of 
Ethiopia through 2005, and were therefore the same for state-owned and private banks. 
Although the entry of new banks contributed to the decline in the lending rate, it did not 
contribute to the decline in the interest-rate spreads. Combined with the fact that there 
are only 10 banks in Ethiopia, the results suggest accordingly that the banking sector 
reflects a non-competitive market structure, especially among private banks, although 
the market share of private banks is still small. 
=== Table 4 === 
Next, we examine quantitatively the performance of state-owned and private 
banks, controlling for other factors such as market share. The model is similar to the one 
used in Berger, Clarke, Cull, Klapper, and Udell (2005). The left-hand-side variables are 
  10bank-performance variables ( ). The right-hand-side variable is a dummy variable 
( ) that takes the value one for state-owned banks and zero for private banks. Other 
control variables ( ) such as the scale of banks are also included in the regression. The 




, 2 1 0 it i it it it Z D y ε η α α α + + + + =                             ( 1 )  
where  i η   is a bank-specific random factor and  it ε  is an error term. Unobserved bank 
heterogeneity is controlled for by the bank-specific random factor. 
For our purposes, we focus on bank performance that includes: (1) the cost 
divided by total assets; (2) return on assets (ROA), defined as interest and non-interest 
expenses divided by total assets; (3) and the interest-rate spread, defined as lending rates 
minus deposit rates. Following Berger et al. (2005), we use market share and the scale 
of last year’s assets as control variables. Market share is defined as the share of assets 
while last year’s assets are included taking natural logs. 
Table 5 indicates the regression results of equation (1) for the performance 
variables. Three findings are evident. First, the costs of state-owned banks are 
significantly higher (1.6 percentage points) than those of private banks. Second, the 
ROA of state-owned banks is 1.7 percentage points lower than private banks. These 
findings imply that state-owned banks are less efficient than private banks. Third, the 
  11interest spread is 1.5 percentage points smaller for state-owned banks than private 
banks. 
=== Table 5 === 
The inefficiency of state-owned banks in Ethiopia is consistent with the 
findings for other countries (La Porta et al., 2002). There is reason to believe that the 
inefficiency of state-owned banks may offset the positive effects of financial 
intermediation. Indeed, several studies have found positive effects of bank privatization 
in developing countries.
7 As a part of financial sector liberalization, the privatization of 
state-owned banks may be another important issue to consider in promoting competition 
in the banking sector.
8
5.  Ethiopian Government Concerns and Opposition to Liberalization 
Given the evidence from the literature and our analysis discussed above of the 
importance of greater openness and foreign participation in enhancing financial 
intermediation and economic growth, it may be surprising that the Ethiopian 
government remains so strongly opposed to financial sector liberalization. It appears 
that the Prime Minister, his economic advisors, and the Cabinet of Ministers are 
particularly concerned about the potential impact of foreign bank entry on the 
development of the domestic banking sector, access to and the allocation of credit, 
  12domestic savings mobilization, the country’s capital account, and the ability of the 
central bank to supervise foreign banks and the new products and services that they 
introduce into the market.
9
Ethiopia’s Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi (2007), has expressed his personal 
views on financial sector reform and development in Africa in a partially completed 
manuscript entitled, African Development: Dead Ends and New Beginnings. His views 
on the past failures of financial reforms and the design of new reforms are of interest. In 
Section 17.2 of his Chapter 17, “Outcome of Economic Reform,” he holds financial 
sector reforms responsible for the high incidence of non-performing loans and excess 
liquidity in many African countries. He attributes this failure to the pervasive lack of 
information in guiding bank operations (bank inability to assess credit), and the lack of 
demand for credit from private sector borrowers that has led to excess liquidity. He 
notes also that there have been high interest-rate spreads, high real rates of interest, and 
pervasive rent-seeking. Excess liquidity reflected the failure of banks to effectively 
mobilize savings and promote lending. In the case of Ethiopia, the Prime Minister and 
his government, as key stakeholders, have five main concerns, many of which are 
shared by other stakeholders, including the leadership of the private banks and the 
Ethiopian Bankers’ Association: 
  13•  The government believes that the development of a viable domestic banking sector 
will be threatened by foreign banks, because they have more capital, more 
experience, and better reputations. They argue that the Ethiopian financial sector is 
too young and inexperienced to compete (the infant industry argument). 
•  Ethiopian government officials also believe that entry by foreign banks will further 
skew credit allocation towards large-scale industrial, real estate and service 
enterprises (including trade) and away from agriculture, small-scale and 
cottage/micro enterprises (sectors which are the priorities for the government’s 
development strategy). They contend that foreign banks will concentrate lending in 
major urban centers using foreign funds, contributing little towards the 
development of rural banking. Furthermore, they contend that foreign banks will 
“cherry pick” the best companies and sectors. 
•  Domestic savings mobilization has been identified as an area of concern to 
Ethiopian officials, who have suggested that foreign banks would lend in their 
home or other foreign currencies and would not be interested in mobilizing 
domestic savings. 
•  There is concern that foreign banks may serve as conduits for the inward and 
outward flows of capital (e.g., through capital and money-market transactions; 
  14credit operations; personal capital movements; etc.). This may cause foreign 
exchange and/or liquidity shortages, with potentially adverse effects on the 
country’s capital account. The concern becomes more pronounced in view of the 
limited regulatory capacity of the central bank. 
•  Finally, it is strongly believed that the authorities will be unable at present to 
regulate and supervise foreign banks effectively. 
6.  Potential Benefits and Qualifications to Liberalization 
While the Ethiopian government’s concerns about financial liberalization are 
understandable, there is nonetheless a compelling case that can be made in our view to 
pursue liberalization. The following are some of the important potential benefits that 
may be realized from liberalization and some qualifications to be taken into account:
10
•  Financial liberalization may have positive effects on the efficiency of the banking 
sector in the host market. This is because domestic banks are forced to compete 
with more efficient foreign banks and because skills and technology levels 
improve.
11 
•  The entry of foreign banks through financial liberalization may improve bank 
supervision through regulatory spillover. According to Goldberg (2007, p. 10): “The 
entry of foreign banks in emerging markets that are healthier than domestic banks 
  15implicitly allows a country to import stronger prudential regulation and increase the 
soundness of the local banking sector.”
12 
•  The entry of foreign banks may also contribute to financial stability in host 
countries. This is because the cross-border flows are generally more volatile than 
locally generated claims by foreign branches and subsidiaries. 
•  As a part of financial sector liberalization, the privatization of state-owned banks 
may be an important option to further enhance the efficiency of the banking sector. 
As discussed in Section 4, numerous studies have confirmed that state-owned banks 
are less efficient than private banks and that privatization generally has positive 
effects on bank performance. 
•  The entry of foreign banks may have positive effects on employment and wages. 
While studies of manufacturing industries have confirmed that FDI generally had 
positive effects on employment and wages in host countries, since banks play an 
important role in financial intermediation, the effects of FDI for financial services 
on employment may be greater and broader than those of FDI for manufacturing 
sectors.
13 
By the same token, financial services liberalization carries certain economic 
risks and uncertainties, some of which are consistent with the stakeholders’ concerns 
  16noted above: 
•  Financial liberalization may cause financial fragility rather than financial stability. 
For example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2001) examined the relationship 
between banking crises and financial liberalization (defined as interest rate 
liberalization) for 53 countries between 1980 and 1995. They found that banking 
crises were more likely to occur in countries whose financial system was liberalized. 
This is especially true in developing countries where the institutional environment 
is weak.
14 
•  In their survey article, Prasad, Rogoff, Wei, and Kose (2007) suggest that the 
positive relationship between financial liberalization and economic growth was 
rather weak in the case of developing countries. But they found that financial 
liberalization could be beneficial under the right circumstances such as high quality 
of governance. 
•  Mishkin (2007) has noted that if financial liberalization is not managed properly, it 
can lead to potentially highly disruptive financial crises. This was borne out in 
Tornell, Westermann, and Martínez (2003), who found that liberalization led to a 
higher incidence of crises. However, they also found that there was more rapid 
economic growth in countries in which there were severe credit market 
  17imperfections. 
•  Foreign banks may not address directly issues of poverty alleviation and the access 
of low-income and rural-based savers and borrowers to financial services. Although 
financial liberalization itself may have positive effects on economic growth, only 
wealthy people may gain from financial development. However, according to 
Mishkin (2007, p. 263): “In countries with better financial development, the income 
of the poorest fifth of the population actually grows faster than average GDP per 
capita.” This is because financial development enables the poor to access credit 
more easily. 
It is evident from the preceding discussion that there may be significant 
economic benefits to be derived from financial sector liberalization, in particular from 
the entry of foreign banks and the privatization of state-owned banks. However, 
attention needs to be paid to the possible detrimental effects that may occur in the case 
of developing countries like Ethiopia. The question then is how the Ethiopian 
authorities should address issues of financial liberalization. 
In undertaking liberalization, it may be important to give particular attention to 
the mode of entry and time frame so that the Ethiopian banking sector can enhance the 
quality of governance and develop its institutional framework, thereby providing 
  18insurance against financial crises. For example, government officials may choose to 
limit the degree of foreign ownership for a specified period of time in an effort to help 
domestic firms to prepare for future competition and enhance the quality of governance. 
Similarly, adjustment measures and regulatory monitoring of foreign bank branches, 
subsidiaries, and greenfield investments are essential in permitting foreign financial 
FDI. 
It is also important for the Ethiopian economy to expand banking in rural areas 
through financial liberalization. It might be possible here to establish a specialized rural 
financial institution that would then take over rural lending activities from the 
state-owned banks through a privatization process.
15  Ethiopia can improve the 
environment for economic growth if it develops policies that promote successful 
financial development and financial liberalization, instead of adamantly resisting 
liberalization.
16
7.  Concluding Remarks 
In our discussion, we noted especially the closed nature of Ethiopia’s banking 
system in which there is no foreign participation, evidence of a non-competitive market 
structure, and strong capital controls. We also had occasion to examine the performance 
of Ethiopia’s state-owned and private banks, noting that state-owned banks were 
  19comparatively inefficient relative to private banks. The combination of the closed 
characteristics of Ethiopia’s banking sector and its non-competitive market structure 
serves to weaken the link between financial intermediation and economic growth, the 
importance of which is borne out extensively in the literature. 
The question thus arises as to whether and how the Ethiopian authorities should 
address issues of financial liberalization. Interviews conducted with stakeholders 
revealed widespread opposition to liberalization on a number of grounds. Some of this 
opposition is understandable in an economy that has been closed to foreign participation 
for several decades. But, in our view, there is a compelling case that can be made for 
liberalization and the significant benefits that it may induce. In pursuing liberalization, 
the stakeholders’ concerns need to be acknowledged and addressed with reference 
especially to improvement of financial regulation and oversight. Finally, there are 
broader considerations that need to be taken into account, given that Ethiopia is among 
the poorest countries in SSA. These broader considerations involve questions of the 
overall strategy of economic development and how to improve the incomes and living 
standards especially of the rural poor. Financial liberalization is not a panacea for 
Ethiopia’s broader economic problems. But it may nonetheless serve to ameliorate these 
problems by improving the efficiency of the banking system and providing the basis for 
  20greater financial intermediation and economic growth. 
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Notes 
1While we focus on the banking sector, much of our analysis can be applied to Ethiopia’s 
insurance and micro-finance activities, which are relatively small compared to banking. 
  24 
2We interpret financial liberalization to include various forms of foreign participation in the 
financial sector as will be noted below, as well as privatization of state-owned banks. 
3The official skepticism towards financial liberalization was manifested in a series of interviews 
that the authors conducted during February to April 2007 in the context of a consultancy about 
undertaking financial liberalization as a part of Ethiopia’s application for WTO accession. 
4However, there have been a few studies of selected financial issues that have included Ethiopia 
in the country cross-section observations. These include: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic (2004), Crowley (2007), and Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007). IMF (2006) 
addresses key macroeconomic issues in Ethiopia, but provides only limited information on the 
financial sector. 
5The Ethiopian banking data used in this section come from the published annual reports of the 
individual banks. 
6It should be noted that in absolute terms, the assets of state-owned banks grew by more than the 
assets of privately held banks, ETB 18 billions, compared to ETB 15 billions, respectively over 
the same time period. 
7For example, Beck, Cull, and Jerome (2005) for Nigeria, Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel (2005) for 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Romania, and Omran (2007) for 
Egypt. 
8Mattoo et al. (2006) have pointed out the importance of the introduction of foreign ownership 
and domestic competition at the same time: “privatizing or introducing foreign ownership 
without introducing competition (or establishing a separate regulator), would simply transfer 
monopoly rents from the government to the private monopolist.” 
9These concerns were raised by government officials, senior bankers and representatives of the 
bankers’ association in Ethiopia in February-April 2007 during interviews with the authors, who 
were preparing a study on the economic impact of WTO accession on Ethiopia’s financial 
  25 
sector. 
10We assume, in discussing these benefits, that foreign entry will be subject to national treatment. 
For a comprehensive survey on the effects of financial FDI in developing countries, see 
Goldberg (2007). 
11For example, Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001) examined 7,900 banks in 80 
countries for 1988-1995 and found that foreign entry reduced the profitability of domestic banks 
but improved the efficiency of the banking sector. 
12Crystal, Dages, and Goldberg (2001) found that the entry of foreign banks had positive effects 
on the overall soundness of local banking systems partly because foreign banks screened and 
treated problem loans more aggressively. 
13The effects may be different between greenfield investments and mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A). According to Goldberg (2007), greenfield investment is expected to have positive 
effects on employment while the effects of M&A are less transparent. 
14However, we should note that there are various types of financial liberalization. In 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2001), the negative effect of financial liberalization comes 
from the liberalization of interest rates, rather than from the entry of foreign banks. 
15Other countries, such as Indonesia and Kenya, have fostered specialized financial institutions 
to deal with rural lending. For more information, see Mwega (2002, Ch.10), Robinson (1997, p. 
24), and World Bank (1999). 
16Our view is closely related to the point made by Mishkin (2007, p. 287): “Bad policies are the 
reason that financial development does not occur and why financial globalization often leads to 
harmful financial crises. Instead of rejecting financial globalization, we can greatly improve the 
environment for economic growth if we develop policies that promote successful financial 
development and financial globalization.” 
  26Table 1.   Key Economic and Social Indicators for Ethiopia and Other African Countries









Economic and Social Indicators
10,018 15,151 12,646 7,786 9,286 4 / 4 41 / 45
140.6 442.3 329.9 270.2 898.7 4 / 4 41 / 45
0.9 -0.1 1.6 3.0 0.5 3 / 4 17 / 45
46.3 27.9 46.2 32.2 28.2 1 / 4 6 / 43
84.0 79.3 75.8 87.4 62.6 2 / 4 3 / 47
42.7 49.0 46.3 50.0 48.7 4 / 4 34 / 46
35.0 50.0 34.2 45.7 47.3 3 / 4 28 / 30
Paved roads (% of total roads, 2003 or 2004) 19.1 14.1 8.6 23.0 24.2 2 / 4 10 / 24
Improved water source (% of population with
access, 2004) 22.0 61.0 62.0 60.0 65.0 4 / 4 47 / 47
English English English English
English
= 14 / 33
Muslim Protestant Muslim Catholic
Muslim
= 12 / 33
Financial Indicators
Liquid liabilities (%, 2004) 44.6 39.2 21.2 19.7 29.8 1 / 4 4 / 27
50.4 90.0 87.5 50.0 67.2 3 / 4 33 / 40
19.1 24.5 7.5 6.1 17.1 2 / 4 5 / 27
3.6 9.3 9.7 7.1 9.2 4 / 4 29 / 42
20.0 50.0 50.0 70.0 48.2 4 / 4 38 / 38
1.12 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.44 n.a. 17 / 17
87.9 58.9 67.2 62.6 80.7 1 / 4 5 / 10
Note: For the list of Sub-Saharan African countries, see Table A1. For definitions of the indicators and sources, see Table A2.
Rural population (% of total population, 2005)
Life expectancy (years, 2005)
GINI index (average, 1990-2005)
Infrastructure
GDP (2005, US$ millions)
Per-capita GDP (2005)
Per-capita GDP growth (annual average, 1995-
2005)
Agriculture dependency (% of GDP, 2005)
Financial liberalization index (10-100, 2007)
Bank concentration (%, 2004)
Private credit (%, 2004)
Legal origin
Religion
Gross domestic saving (% of GDP, 2005)
Commercial-central bank (%, 2004)
Dailami's financial openness index: 1.12 (closed) -
1.93 (free) (1997)Table 2.  Assets of Ethiopian Banks, 1998-2006
Value (Millions of ETB) 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
State-owned banks 19,732 19,936 23,417 25,035 25,673 27,697 33,113 35,001 37,646
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia 17,503 17,434 19,828 21,489 22,146 24,200 27,975 33,169 35,849
Development Bank of Ethiopia 2,229 2,502 2,615 2,578 2,569 2,555 4,081 n.a. n.a.
Construction and Business Bank n.a. n.a. 974 968 958 942 1,057 1,832 1,797
Private banks 1,354 2,040 3,157 4,036 5,234 6,968 9,093 12,253 16,443
Dashen Bank 511 674 865 1,100 1,486 1,991 2,677 3,420 4,546
Awash International Bank 452 536 759 907 1,112 1,401 1,770 2,226 2,954
Bank of Abyssinia 206 388 718 896 1,142 1,333 1,585 2,057 2,834
Wegagen Bank 185 366 514 583 646 889 1,140 1,616 2,259
United Bank n.a. 76 143 214 314 469 674 1,073 1,599
Cooperative Bank of Oromia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 129 224
Nib International Bank n.a. n.a. 158 336 534 885 1,247 1,732 2,027
Total 21,086 21,976 26,574 29,071 30,907 34,665 42,206 47,254 54,089
Share (%) 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
State-owned banks 93.6 90.7 88.1 86.1 83.1 79.9 78.5 74.1 69.6
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia 83.0 79.3 74.6 73.9 71.7 69.8 66.3 70.2 66.3
Development Bank of Ethiopia 10.6 11.4 9.8 8.9 8.3 7.4 9.7 n.a. n.a.
Construction and Business Bank n.a. n.a. 3.7 3.3 3.1 2.7 2.5 3.9 3.3
Private banks 6.4 9.3 11.9 13.9 16.9 20.1 21.5 25.9 30.4
Dashen Bank 2.4 3.1 3.3 3.8 4.8 5.7 6.3 7.2 8.4
Awash International Bank 2.1 2.4 2.9 3.1 3.6 4.0 4.2 4.7 5.5
Bank of Abyssinia 1.0 1.8 2.7 3.1 3.7 3.8 3.8 4.4 5.2
Wegagen Bank 0.9 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.6 2.7 3.4 4.2
United Bank n.a. 0.3 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.4 1.6 2.3 3.0
Cooperative Bank of Oromia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.3 0.4
Nib International Bank n.a. n.a. 0.6 1.2 1.7 2.6 3.0 3.7 3.7
Note: n.a. (not available)
Sources: Annual Reports of the individual banks.Table 3.  Total Assets and Return on Assets (ROA) for State-Owned and Private Banks, 1998-2006
year State-owned Private State-owned Private State-owned Private
1998 19732 1354 93.6 6.4 0.015 0.005
1999 19936 2040 90.7 9.3 0.007 0.016
2000 23417 3157 88.1 11.9 0.011 0.014
2001 25035 4036 86.1 13.9 0.005 0.020
2002 25673 5234 83.1 16.9 -0.004 0.012
2003 27697 6968 79.9 20.1 -0.002 0.011
2004 33113 9093 78.5 21.5 0.005 0.021
2005 35001 12253 74.1 25.9 0.013 0.021
2006 37646 16443 69.6 30.4 0.027 0.022
Notes: 1) Total assets are sum of assets for state-owned and private banks.
2) ROA is average for public and private banks.
Sources: Annual Reports of the individual banks.
Table 4.  Interest-Rate Spreads between State-Owned and Private Banks, 1998-2006
Interest rate spread
year State-owned Private State-owned Private State-owned Private
1998 4.5 5.0 10.5 11.0 6.0 6.0
1999 4.5 5.0 10.5 11.0 6.0 6.0
2000 4.5 5.3 10.5 11.3 6.0 6.0
2001 4.5 5.4 10.5 11.4 6.0 6.0
2002 5.0 6.4 8.0 9.4 3.0 3.0
2003 5.0 6.5 8.0 9.5 3.0 3.0
2004 5.0 6.4 8.0 9.4 3.0 3.0
2005 5.0 6.0 8.0 9.0 3.0 3.0
2006 5.0 6.0 8.0 9.0 3.0 3.0
Note: Figures are average for state-owned and private banks.
Sources: Annual Reports of the individual banks.
ROA Total assets
Lending rate Deposit rate





State-owned bank dummy 0.016* -0.017* -0.015***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.005]
Market share 0.004 -0.002 -0.001
[0.005] [0.005] [0.003]
Lag of log of assets -0.008*** 0.005** 0.003**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
Constant 0.104*** -0.013 0.040***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.009]
R-squared 0.224 0.189 0.207
N 66 66 62
Notes:
Sources: Annual Reports of the individual banks.
1) Random-effect model is used for the estimation.
2) ***, **, and * indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
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Liberia ZimbabweTable A2.  Definitions and Sources of Indicators
Variables Definitions Sources
Macroeconomic and social indicators
Real per-capita GDP in 2005 (2000 Constant US dollars) World Bank (2007)
Real per-capita GDP growth from 1995 to 2005 World Bank (2007)
Value added of agricultural sector in 2005 (% of GDP) World Bank (2007)
Population in rural area in 2005 (% of total population) World Bank (2007)
Life expectancy World Bank (2007)
Average of GINI index from 1990 to 2005 (0 = perfect income equality;
100 = perfect income inequality)
World Bank (2007)
Paved roads (% of total roads, 2003
or 2004)
Paved roads in 2003 or 2004 (% of total roads) World Bank (2007)
Improved water source (% of
population with access, 2004)
Improved water source in 2004 (% of population with reasonable access to
an adequate amount of water from an improved source)
World Bank (2007)
Financial intermediary indicators
Ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP in 2004 (% of GDP) Beck and Al-Hussainy (2007)
Ratio of deposit money bank claims on domestic nonfinancial real sector
to the sum of deposit money bank and Central Bank claims on domestic
nonfinancial real sector in 2004
Beck and Al-Hussainy (2007)
Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP in 2004 Beck and Al-Hussainy (2007)
Gross domestic saving (GDP less total consumption) in 2005 (% of GDP) World Bank (2007)
The composite index of coding of rules, regulations, and administrative
procedures affecting capital flows for a total of 27 individual transactions
in the current and capital accounts of the balance of payments (1.12 = the
most closed; 1.93 = the most opened)
Dailami (2000)
A measure of banking security as well as independence from government
control (0 = the lowest freedom; 100 = the highest freedom)
Kayne, Holmes, and O'Grady
(2007)
Assets of three largest banks as a share of assets of all commercial banks
in 2004 (%)
Beck and Al-Hussainy (2007)
Bank concentration (%, 2004)
Life expectancy (years, 2005)
GINI index (average, 1990-2005)
Infrastructure
Gross domestic saving (% of GDP,
2005)
Financial Freedom Index (10-100, 2007)
Liquid liabilities (%, 2004)
Commercial-central bank (%, 2004)
Private credit (%, 2004)
Dailami's financial openness index: 1.12
(closed) -1.93 (free) (1997)
Per-capita GDP (2005)
Per-capita GDP growth (annual average,
1990-2005)
Agriculture dependency (% of GDP,
2005)
Rural population